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Abstract 
 
 This paper employs a recent methodological innovation on intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) harmonization to project global timelines for common policies against business 
software piracy. The findings on 99 countries are premised on 15 fundamental characteristics 
of software piracy based on income-levels (high-income, lower-middle-income, upper-
middle-income and low-income), legal-origins (English common-law, French civil-law, 
German civil-law and, Scandinavian civil-law) and, regional proximity (South Asia, Europe 
& Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the 
Caribbean and, Sub-Saharan Africa). The results broadly show that a feasible horizon for the 
harmonization of blanket policies ranges from 4 to 10 years.  
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 1. Introduction 
 According to the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the tide of decline in software 
piracy on personal computers (PCs) in many countries a few years ago has been stemmed and 
reversed by fast growing PC makers in some of the world’s highest piracy nations which have 
caused the overall numbers to worsen (BSA, 2007). Accordingly, dollar losses from software 
piracy have risen by $8 billion to nearly $48 billion, and with the trend expected to soar 
exponentially, there has been renewed interest in measures of fighting software piracy 
(Andrés, 2006; Andrés & Goel, 2011; Andrés & Goel, 2012; Andrés & Asongu, 2013a; 
Asongu, 2012a). However, a recent trend has emerged on the feasibility of and timelines for 
common policies against the scourge (Andrés & Asongu, 2013b; Asongu, 2012b).  
 In light of the above, this paper provides a global picture on feasible timelines for 
intellectual property rights (henceforth, IPRs) harmonization against software piracy based on 
recent methodological innovations on the adoption of common policies. The empirical 
evidence is based on 99 countries, and the richness of the dataset provides us with the degrees 
of freedom necessary to disaggregate countries into fundamental characteristics of piracy 
based on income-levels, legal origins and regional proximity. The intuition motivating the 
study is that, upholding blanket IPRs policies in the battle against software piracy may not be 
effective unless they are contingent on the fundamental characteristics and prevailing 
trajectories, dynamics and tendencies of software piracy within identified fundamental 
characteristics. The theoretical and empirical underpinnings from the convergence literature 
are twofold: convergence in piracy rates within a fundamental characteristic will mean the 
adoption of common policies is feasible, and full convergence implies the enforcement of the 
common policies without distinction of nationality or locality within each fundamental 
characteristic (Asongu, 2012b).  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and outlines 
the empirical method. Section 3 discusses the estimation results, and Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 The data includes annual observations for ninety nine countries for the years 1994-
2010. The limitations to 99 countries and the 17 year annual periodicity are due to constraints 
in software piracy data availability. In our paper, the measure of piracy employed is the 
percentage of software (primarily business software) in a country that is illegally installed 
(without a license) annually and is taken to capture the extent of software piracy. Piracy rates 
are obtained from the Business Software Alliance (BSA, 2011)
1
. Since it is unlikely to find 
convergence within a highly heterogeneous set of countries, fundamental characteristics are 
determined in terms of legal origins (Asongu, 2012ab; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999), income-
levels (Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; Kranenburg & Hogenbirk, 2005; Kim, 2004; 
Depken & Simmons, 2004; Moores & Esichaikul, 2011) and regional proximity (Narayan et 
al., 2011; BSA, 2011)
2
. The choice of the control variables is contingent on theoretical 
underpinnings of conditional convergence, which state that, if countries differ in 
macroeconomic and institutional characteristics on which software piracy is endogenous then, 
it is possible for conditional convergence to take place. Nine control variables are employed 
in two different specifications to control for macroeconomic and institutional determinants of 
                                                 
1
 Among the many researchers that have used this data are Andrés (2006), Andrés and Goel (2011), Asongu 
(2013a,b), Andrés and Asongu (2013ab) and Marron and Steel (2000). 
2
 Note should be taken of the fact that, government quality (transparency, corruption, regulation quality, etc …) 
and macroeconomic fundamental characteristics have the draw-back of being time-dynamic. Hence, cannot be 
used.  
software piracy. These include: economic prosperity, research and development (R&D), 
internet penetration, population growth and IPRs laws (Constitution, Main intellectual 
property (IP) law, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties, Multilateral 
treaties and Bilateral treaties)
3
. Data for the explanatory variables were taken from the World 
Bank Development Indicators (WDI), and the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD). The summary statistics show that, there is quite a degree of variation in the data 
utilized so that one should be comfortable and confident that reasonable estimated 
relationships would emerge. Pearson’s correlation coefficients were computed. These 
coefficients indicate that multicollinearity does not appear to be at hand here. 
4
  
 
 
2.2 Methodology  
The estimation procedure typically follows evidence from recent convergence 
literature (Asongu, 2012b). The choice of the β-convergence strategy is due to constraints in 
the data set, which is a panel. The dynamic panel system GMM employed is as follows: 
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 where tiY ,  is the proxy for the rate of piracy in a country i at period t. σ = 1+ β. tiW ,  is a 
vector of determinants of piracy (or control variables), i  is a country-specific effect, t  is a 
time-specific constant, and, ti ,  an error term. The first two equations above are the standard 
approaches in the literature for investigating conditional convergence if tiW ,  is taken as 
strictly exogenous (Fung, 2009, p. 3). The dynamic system GMM approach is based on the 
last two equations. Absolute convergence is estimated without tiW , . In line with Islam (1995, 
p. 14), yearly time spans are too short to be appropriate for studying convergence as short-run 
disturbances may loom substantially in such brief time spans. Therefore, considering the data 
span of 17 years, we are consistent with Asongu (2012b) in using two-year non-overlapping 
intervals (NOI)
5
. This means in our analysis, τ is set to 2. We also compute the implied rate of 
convergence by calculating σ/2. Hence, the estimated coefficient of the lagged differenced 
endogenous variable is divided by 2 because we have used a two year interval to absorb the 
short-term disturbances. With 10   , we conclude on the evidence of convergence. The 
broader interpretation suggests, past variations have less proportionate impact on future 
differences, implying the variation on the left hand side of Eq. (2) is decreasing overtime 
(Asongu, 2012b). 
 
 
3. Empirical results  
 Table 1 presents the main findings that answer the three questions motivating paper. In 
other words, policy makers are most likely to ask the following three questions before 
                                                 
3
 Please see Appendix 1 for definitions and sources of the variables.  
4
 Owing space constraints, the summary statistics and correlation analysis have not been presented but can be 
provided upon request.  
5
 We have 9 two-year non-overlapping intervals: 1994; 1995-1996; 1997-1998; 1999-2000; 2001-2002; 2003-
2004; 2005-2006; 2007-2008; 2009-2010. Owing to data and periodical constraints, the first interval is short of 
one year.  
considering the harmonization of IPRs policies on software piracy. (1) Is software piracy 
converging globally or not? (2) If this were so, what are the rate and timing of the 
convergence process? (3) For which relevant fundamental characteristics (of software piracy) 
do answers to the first and second questions apply? Whereas an answer to the first question 
will guide on the feasibility of harmonizing blanket policies, the answer to the second will 
guide on an optimal timeframe for such blanket policies. Ultimately, the answer to the third 
(given that the first-two are already answered), will determine the feasibility-of, timeframe-for 
and exclusiveness (or non-arbitrariness) of the common IPRs policies. This third question is 
most relevant because, it underlines the need for common policies to be contingent on the 
prevailing speeds of and time for full (100%) convergence within each identified fundamental 
characteristic of software piracy.  
 Concerning the first question raised, software piracy is not converging from a global 
perspective. This implies the answer to the second question is not applicable. The absence of 
convergence at the world level justifies the harmonization of policies based on fundamental 
characteristics of income-levels, legal origins and regional proximities. The findings based on 
these fundamental characteristics broadly show that a feasible horizon for the harmonization 
of blanket policies ranges from 4 to 10 years.  
 
Table 1: Timelines for policy harmonization against software piracy  
        
  Absolute Convergence  
(AC) 
Conditional Convergence 
(CC) 
  AC % of AC Yrs to AC CC % of CC Yrs to CC 
 
Income 
Levels 
High Income Yes 35.00% 5.71 Yrs  Yes 28.00% 7.14 Yrs 
Upper Middle Income  Yes 38.50% 5.19 Yrs Yes 38.50% 5.19 Yrs 
Lower Middle Income  Yes 40.00% 5.00 Yrs  Yes 19.25% 10.38 Yrs 
Low Income  No  --- ---  No  --- ---   
        
 
Legal 
Origins  
English Common Law  Yes 34.50% 5.79 Yrs Yes 45.00% 4.44 Yrs 
French Civil Law  Yes 38.00% 5.26 Yrs Yes 31.00% 6.45 Yrs 
German Civil Law  No --- ---  Yes 24.50% 8.16 Yrs 
Scandinavian Civil Law No --- ---  No --- ---  
        
 
 
 
Regions  
South Asia  Yes 46.00% 4.34 Yrs No --- ---  
Europe & Central Asia No --- ---  Yes 34.50% 5.79Yrs 
East Asia & Pacific  Yes 39.00% 5.12 Yrs  Yes 24.00% 8.33Yrs 
Middle East & North Africa Yes 38.00% 5.26 Yrs Yes 38.50% 5.19Yrs 
Sub-Saharan Africa  Yes 42.50% 4.70 Yrs Yes  37.00% 5.40Yrs 
Latin America & the Caribbean Yes  37.50% 5.33 Yrs Yes 43.50% 4.59Yrs 
        
World No --- ---  No --- ---  
        
Source: Own construction 
Yrs: Years.  
 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 This paper has been a response to growing policy efforts toward IPRs harmonization 
against business software piracy. We have provided the basis for blanket policies against the 
scourge using 15 fundamental characteristics. The global dynamic timelines provided are 
based income-levels (high-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and low-
income), legal-origins (English common-law, French civil-law, German civil-law and, 
Scandinavian civil-law) and regional proximity (South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East 
Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean and,  Sub-
Saharan Africa). In the timeline to full convergence, countries within a given fundamental 
characteristic can work toward feasible common policies and upon full convergence (100%), 
the adopted policies can be implemented without distinction of nationality or locality.  
 
Appendix  
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions, and sources 
Variables   Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
Piracy Piracy Logarithm of Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Growth per capita GDP Logarithm of  real GDP per Capita, PPP (international 
constant dollars, 2005) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Research and 
Development  
R & D Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet Penetration Internet Logarithm of Internet Users per 1000   GMID 
    
PC Users  PC Logarithm of PC Users per capita  GMID 
    
Population  Pop. Logarithm of the total Population  World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Constitution  Const. Dummy variable: Copyright is mentioned in the constitution  WIPO 
    
Main_IP_law MIPlaw Main Intellectual Property Law WIPO 
    
IP_rlaw IPrlaw Intellectual Property Rights Law WIPO 
    
Wipo_treaties WIIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  WIPO 
    
Mutilateral Multi. Multilateral Treaties  WIPO 
    
Bilateral Bilat.  Bilateral  Treaties  WIPO 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. BSA: Business Software Alliance. GMID: Global 
Market Information Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Log: Logarithm. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization.  
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